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Abstract 
Cyber criminality activities are changing and becoming more 
and more professional. With the growth of financial flows 
through the Internet and the Information System (IS), new kinds 
of thread arise involving complex scenarios spread within 
multiple IS components. The IS information modeling and 
Behavioral Analysis are becoming new solutions to normalize 
the IS information and counter these new threads. This paper 
presents a framework which details the principal and necessary 
steps for monitoring an IS. We present the architecture of the 
framework, i.e. an ontology of activities carried out within an IS 
to model security information and User Behavioral analysis. 
The results of the performed experiments on real data show that 
the modeling is effective to reduce the amount of events by 
91%. The User Behavioral Analysis on uniform modeled data is 
also effective, detecting more than 80% of legitimate actions of 
attack scenarios. 
Key words: Security Information, Heterogeneity, Intrusion 
Detection, Behavioral Analysis, Ontology. 
1. Introduction 
Today, information technology and networking resources 
are dispersed across an organization.  Threats are similarly 
distributed across many organization resources. Therefore, 
the Security of information systems (IS) is becoming an 
important part of business processes. Companies must deal 
with open systems on the one hand and ensure a high 
protection on the other hand.  As a common task, an 
administrator starts with the identification of threats 
related to business assets, and applies a security product 
on each asset to protect an IS. Then, administrators tend to 
combine and multiply security products and protection 
techniques such as firewalls, antivirus, Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and 
security audits. 
 
But are the actions carried out an IS only associated with 
attackers? Although the real figures are difficult to know, 
most experts agree that the greatest threat for security 
comes not only from outside, but also from inside the 
company. Now, administrators are facing new 
requirements consisting in tracing the legitimate users. Do 
we need to trace other users of IS even if they are 
legitimate? Monitoring attackers and legitimate users aims 
at detecting and identifying a malicious use of the IS, 
stopping attacks in progress and isolating the attacks that 
may occur, minimizing risks and preventing future attacks 
to take counter  measures. To trace legitimate users, some 
administrators perform audit on applications, operating 
systems and administrators products.  Events triggered by 
these mechanisms are thus relevant for actions to be 
performed by legitimate users on these particular 
resources. 
 
Monitoring organization resources produces a great 
amount of security-relevant information. Devices such as 
firewalls, VPN, IDS, operating systems and switches may 
generate tens of thousands of events per second. Security 
administrators are facing the task of analyzing an 
increasing number of alerts and events. The approaches 
implemented in security products are different, security 
products analysis may not be exact, they may produce 
false positives (normal events considered as attacks) and 
false negatives (Malicious events considered as normal). 
Alerts and events can be of different natures and level of 
granularity; in the form of logs, Syslog, SNMP traps, 
security alerts and other reporting mechanisms. This 
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information is extremely valuable and the operations that 
must be carried out on security require a constant analysis 
of these data to guarantee knowledge on threats in real 
time. An appropriate treatment for these issues is not 
trivial and needs a large range of knowledge. Until 
recently, the combined security status of an organization 
could not be decided. To compensate for this failure, 
attention must be given to integrate local security disparate 
observations into a single view of the composite security 
state of an organization. 
 
To address this problem, both vendors and researchers 
have proposed various approaches. Vendors’ approaches 
are referred to as Security Information Management (SIM) 
or Security Event Management (SEM). They address a 
company’s need to manage alerts, logs and events, and 
any other security elementary information coming from 
company resources such as networking devices of all 
sorts, diverse security products (such as firewalls, IDS and 
antivirus), operating systems, applications and databases. 
The purpose is to create a good position for observation 
from which an enterprise can manage threats, exposure, 
risk, and vulnerabilities. The industry’ approaches focus 
on information technology events in addition to security 
event. They can trace IS user, although the user is an 
attacker or a legitimate user. The intrusion detection 
research community has developed a number of different 
approaches to make security products interact. They focus 
on the correlation aspect in the analysis step of data, they 
do not provide insights into what properties of the data 
being analyzed. 
 
The question asked in this article is to know what is 
missing in today’s distributed intrusion detection. 
However, it is not clear how the different parts that 
compose Vendor product should be.  Vendor’s approaches 
do not give information on how data are modeled and 
analyzed. Moreover, vendors claim that they can detect 
attacks, but how can they do if the information is 
heterogeneous?  How can they rebuild IS misuse 
scenarios? All the same, research works lack of details on 
the different components, which make the correlation 
process effective. They were developed in particular 
environments. They rarely address the nature of the data to 
be analyzed, they do not give global vision of the security 
state of an IS because some steps are missing to build the 
IS scenarios of use. Both approaches do not indicate how 
they should be implemented and evaluated. Therefore, a 
coherent architecture and explanation of a framework, 
which manages company’s security effectively is needed. 
 
The framework must collect and normalize data across a 
company structure, then cleverly analyze data in order to 
give administrators a global view of the security status 
within the company. It can send alerts to administrators so 
that actions can be taken or it can automate responses that 
risks can be addressed and remediated quickly, by taking 
actions such as shutting down an account of a legitimate 
user who misuses the IS or ports on firewalls.  
 
The distributed architecture concept, DIDS (Distributive 
Intrusion Detection System), first appeared in 1989 
(Haystack Lab). This first analysis of distributed 
information did not present a particular architecture but 
collected the information of several audit files on IS hosts. 
The recent global IS monitoring brings new challenges in 
the collection and analysis of distributed data. Recent 
distributed architectures are mostly based on Agents. 
These types of architectures are mainly used in research 
projects and commercial solutions (Arcsight, Netforensic, 
Intellitactics, LogLogic). An agent is an autonomy 
application with predefined goals [31]. These goals are 
various: monitor an environment, deploy counter-
measures, pre-analyze information, etc. The autonomy and 
goal of an agent would depend on a used architecture. 
Two types of architecture can be highlighted, distributive 
centralized architecture and distributive collaborative 
architecture.  Zheng Zhang et al. [1] provided a 
hierarchical centralized architecture for network attacks 
detection. The authors recommend a three-layer 
architecture which collects and analyzes information from 
IS components and from other layers. This architecture 
provides multiple levels of analysis for the network attacks 
detection; a local attack detection provided by the first 
layer and a global attack detection provided by upper 
layers. A similar architecture was provided by [39] for the 
network activity graph construction revealing local and 
global casual structures of the network activity. K. 
Boudaoud [4] provides a hierarchical collaborative 
architecture. Two main layers are used. The first one is 
composed of agents which analyze local components to 
discover intrusion based on their analysis of their own 
knowledge but also with the knowledge of other agents. 
The upper layer collects information from the first layer 
and tries to detect global attacks. In order to detect 
intrusions, each agent holds attacks signatures (simple 
pattern for the first layer, attack graph for the second 
layer). Helmer et al. [13] provide a different point of view 
by using mobile agents. A light weight agent has the 
ability to “travel" on different data sources. Each mobile 
agent uses a specific schema of analysis (Login Failed, 
System Call, TCP connection) and can communicate with 
other agents to refine their analyses.  
 
Despite many discussions, scalability, analysis availability 
and collaborative architecture are difficult to apply, in 
today’s, infrastructure but also time and effort consuming.
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 2, 2009 
IJCSI  
20
 
Thus, despite known drawbacks, distributive centralized 
architectures will be used in our approach for the analysis 
of distributive knowledge in the IS. 
 
All IS and User behaviors’ actions are distributed inside IS 
components. In order to collect and analyze these 
knowledge, we propose an architecture composed of 
distributed agents allowing distributive data operations.  
Distributive agent aims at collecting data by making pre-
operations and forwarding this information to an Analysis 
Server. The Analysis Server holds necessary information 
to correlate and detect abnormal IS behaviors. This 
architecture is a hierarchical central architecture. 
Distributive agents share two main functionalities: 
• a collector function aiming at collecting information on 
monitored components, 
• an homogenization function aiming at standardizing and 
filtering collected information. 
As shown in figure 1, three types of agents are used. The 
constructor-based agent aims at collecting information 
from a specific IS components (Window Host, Juniper 
firewall).  
The multi-collector based agent aims at collecting 
information from several IS components redirecting their 
flow of log (syslog). Then, the multi-service based agent 
aims at collecting several different information (system 
log, Web server application log) from a single IS 
component. 
 
This paper presents a comprehensive framework to 
manage information security intelligently so that processes 
implemented in analysis module are effective. We focus 
our study on the information modeling function, the 
information volume reductions and the Abnormal Users 
Behavior detection. A large amount of data triggered in a 
business context is then analyzed by the framework.  The  
results show that the effectiveness of the analysis process 
is highly dependent on the data modeling, and that 
unknown attack scenarios could be efficiently detected 
without hard pre-descriptive information. Our decision 
module also allows reducing false positive. 
 
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. In the 
next section, related work on security event modeling and 
behavioral analysis is covered. In the third section, the 
proposed modeling for event security in the context of IS 
global vision is presented. Section 4 details the anomaly 
detection module. The validation of the homogenization 
function and the anomaly detection module is performed 
on real data and presented in Section 5. Finally, the 
conclusions and perspectives of our work are mentioned in 
the last section. 
2. Related Work 
As mentioned in the introduction, security monitoring of 
an IS is strongly related to the information generated in 
products’ log file and to the analysis carried out on this 
information. In this section, we address both event 
modeling and Behavioral Analysis state of the art. 
2.1 Event Modeling 
All the research works performed on information security 
modeling direct our attention on describing attacks. There 
is a lack of describing information security in the context 
of a global vision of the IS security introduced in the 
previous section. As events are generated in our 
framework by different products, events can be 
represented in different formats with a different 
vocabulary. Information modeling aims to represent each 
product event into a common format. The common format 
requires a common specification of the semantics and the 
Fig. 1 Global Anomaly Intrusion Detection Architecture 
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syntax of the events. There is a high number of alerts 
classification proposed for use in intrusion detection 
research. Four approaches were used to describe attacks:  
list of terms, taxonomies, ontologies and attacks language. 
The easiest classification proposes a list of single terms [7, 
18], covering various aspects of attacks. The number of 
terms differs from an author to another one. Other authors 
have created categories regrouping many terms under a 
common definition. Cheswick and Bellovin classify 
attacks into seven categories [5]. Stallings classification 
[38] is based on the action. The model focuses on 
transiting data and defines four categories of attacks: 
interruption, interception, modification and fabrication. 
Cohen [6] groups attacks into categories that describe the 
result of an attack. Other authors developed categories 
based on empirical data. Each author uses an events 
corpus generated in a specific environment. Neumann and 
Parker [25] works were based on a corpus of 3000 
incidents collected for 20 years; they created nine classes 
according to attacking techniques. Terms tend to not be 
mutually exclusive; this type of classification can not 
provide a classification scheme that avoids ambiguity.
  
 
To avoid these drawbacks, a lot of taxonomies were 
developed to describe attacks. Neumann [24] extended the 
classification in [25] by adding the exploited 
vulnerabilities and the impact of the attack. Lindqvist and 
Jonson [21] presented a classification based on the 
Neumann classification [25].  They proposed intrusion 
results and intrusion techniques as dimension for 
classification.  John Howard [16] presented a taxonomy of 
computer and network attacks. The taxonomy consists in 
five dimensions: attackers, tools, access, results and 
objectives. The author worked on the incidents of the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the 
taxonomy is a process-driven. Howard extends his work 
by refining some of the dimensions [15]. Representing 
attacks by taxonomies is an improvement compared with 
the list of terms: individual attacks are described with an 
enriched semantics, but taxonomies fail to meet mutual 
exclusion requirements, some of the categories may 
overlap. However, the ambiguity problem still exists with 
the refined taxonomy. 
 
Undercoffer and al [3] describe attacks by an ontology. 
Authors have proposed a new way of sharing the 
knowledge about intrusions in distributed IDS 
environment. Initially, they developed a taxonomy defined 
by the target, means, consequences of an attack and the 
attacker. The taxonomy was extended to an ontology, by 
defining the various classes, their attributes and their 
relations based on an examination of 4000 alerts. The 
authors have built correlation decisions based on the 
knowledge that exists in the modeling. The developed 
ontology represents the data model for the triggered 
information by IDSs. 
 
Attack languages are proposed by several authors to detect 
intrusions. These languages are used to describe the 
presence of attacks in a suitable format. These languages 
are classified in six distinct categories presented in [12]: 
Exploit languages, event languages, detection languages, 
correlation languages, reporting languages and response 
languages. The Correlation languages are currently the 
interest of several researchers in the intrusion detection 
community. They specify relations between attacks to 
identify numerous attacks against the system.  These 
languages have different characteristics but are suitable for 
intrusion detection, in particular environments. Language 
models are based on the models that are used for 
describing alerts or events semantic. They do not model 
the semantics of events but they implicitly use taxonomies 
of attacks in their modeling. 
 
All the researches quoted above only give a partial vision 
of the monitored system, they were focused on the 
conceptualization of attacks or incidents, which is due to 
the consideration of a single type of monitoring product 
which is the IDS. It is important to mention the efforts 
done to realize a data model for information security.  The 
first attempts were undertaken by the American agency - 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
which has created the Common Intrusion Detection 
Framework (CIDF) [32]. The objective of the CIDF is to 
develop protocols and applications so that intrusion 
detection research projects can share information. Work 
on CIDF was stopped in 1999 and this format was not 
implemented by any product. Some ideas introduced in the 
CIDF have encouraged the creation of a work group called 
Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG) at Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). IETF have proposed the 
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) 
[8] as a way to set a standard representation for intrusion 
alerts. IDMEF became a standard format with the RFC 
476521. The effort of the IDMEF is centered on alert 
syntax representation.  In the implementations of IDSs, 
each IDS chooses the name of the attack, different IDSs 
can give different names to the same attack.  As a result, 
similar information can be tagged differently and handled 
as two different alerts. 
 
Modeling information security is a necessary and 
important task.  Information security is the input data for 
all the analysis processes, e.g. the correlation process. All 
                                                          
1 http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4765.txt 
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the analysis processes require automatic processing of 
information. Considering the number of alerts or events 
generated in a monitored system, the process, which 
manages this information, must be able to think on these 
data. We need an information security modeling based on 
abstraction of deployed products and mechanisms, which 
helps the classification process, avoids ambiguity to 
classify an event, and reflects the reality. Authors in 
[16,21] agree that the proposed classification for intrusion 
detection must have the following characteristics: 
accepted, unambiguous, understandable, determinist, 
mutually exclusive, exhaustive. To ensure the presence of 
all these characteristics, it is necessary to use an ontology 
to describe the semantics of security information. 
2.2 Behavioral Analysis 
Even if Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) and 
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) tools are 
known to be efficient for local vision by detecting or 
blocking unusual and forbidden activities, they can not 
detect new attack scenarios involving several network 
components. Focusing on this issue, industrial and 
research communities show a great interest in the Global 
Information System Monitoring. 
 
Recent literatures in the intrusion detection field [30] aim 
at discovering and modeling global attack scenarios and 
Information System dependencies (IS components 
relationships). In fact, recent approaches deal with the 
Global Information System Monitoring like [22] who 
describes a hierarchical attack scenario representation. The 
authors provide an evaluation of the most credible 
attacker’s step inside a multistage attack scenario. [28] 
computes also attack scenario graphs through the 
association of vulnerabilities on IS components and 
determines a "distance" between correlated events and 
these attack graphs.  In the same way, [26] used a semi-
explicit correlation method to automatically build attack 
scenarios. With a pre-processing stage, the authors model 
pre-conditions and post conditions for each event. The 
association of pre and post conditions of each event leads 
to the construction of graphs representing attack scenarios. 
Other approaches automatically discover an attack 
scenario with model checking methods, which involves a 
full IS component interaction and configuration 
description [36]. 
 
However, classical intrusion detection schemes are 
composed of two types of detection:  Signature based and 
Anomaly based detections. The anomaly detection is not 
developed regarding to Global IS Monitoring. Few 
approaches intend to model system normal behavior. 
Authors in [11] model IS components’ interactions in 
order to discover causes of IS disaster (Forensic Analysis). 
The main purpose of this approach is to build casual 
relationships between IS components to discover the 
origin of an observed effect.  The lack of anomaly 
detection System can be explained by the fact that 
working on the Global vision introduces three main 
limitations. First of all, the volume of computed data can 
reach thousands of events per second. Secondly, collected 
information is heterogeneous due to the fact that each IS 
component holds its own events description. Finally, the 
complexity of attacks scenarios and IS dependencies 
increases very quickly with the volume of data. 
3. Event Modeling 
As we previously stated, managing information security 
has to deal with the several differences existing in the 
monitoring products. To achieve this goal, it is necessary 
to transform raw messages in a uniform representation. 
Indeed, all the events and alerts must be based on the same 
semantics description, and be transformed in the same data 
model. To have a uniform representation of semantics, we 
focus on concepts handled by the products, we use them to 
describe the semantics messages. In this way, we are able 
to offset products types, functions, and products languages 
aside. The Abstraction concept was already evoked in 
intrusions detection field by Ning and Al [27]. Authors 
consider that the abstraction is important for two primary 
reasons. First, the systems to be protected as well as IDSs 
are heterogeneous. In particular, a distributed system is 
often composed of various types of heterogeneous 
components. Abstraction becomes thus a necessary means 
to hide the difference between these component systems, 
and to allow the detection of intrusions in the distributed 
systems. Secondly, abstraction is often used to remove all 
the non relevant details, so that IDS can avoid an useless 
complexity and concentrate on the essential information. 
The description of the information generated by a 
deployed solution is strongly related to the action 
perceived by the system, this action can be observed at 
any time of its life cycle: its launching, its interruption or 
its end. An event can inform that: an action has just 
started, it is in progress, it failed or it is finished.  To 
simplify, we retained information semantics modeling via 
the concept of observed action. We obtain thus a modeling 
that fits to any type of observation, and meets the 
abstraction criteria.  
 
3.1 Action Theory 
In order to model the observed action, we refer to the 
works that have already been done in the Action Theory of 
the philosophy field. According to the traditional model of 
the action explained by the authors in [9,19], an action is 
an Intention directed to an Object and uses a Movement. It  
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is generally conceded that intentions have a motivation 
role for the action. Authors underline that this role is not 
limited in starting the action but in supporting it until its 
completion. Our actions utilize movements, explanation of 
the action remains incomplete if we do not take into 
account the movements. Movement is the means to 
achieve the action. The object is the target towards which 
the action is directed to. In summary, the human actions 
are in conformity with a certain logic. To say that an agent 
carries out an action A, it is to say that the agent had an 
Intention I, by making a Movement M to produce an effect 
on a Target T of Action A. Action’s basic model is so 
composed by the following concepts: intention, movement 
and target. 
3.2 Event Semantics 
We observe the action performed in the monitored system 
and see that this action is dissociating from the human 
mind. We add another concept, i.e. the Effect, to the basic 
model (Intention, Movement and Target) of the Action 
Theory. We can say that this modeling is a general 
modeling, it can be adapted to any context of the 
monitoring such as in IS intruders monitoring, or in the 
monitoring of bank physical intruders. All we have to do, 
is to instantiate the meta-model with the intrusion 
detection context’s vocabulary. 
 
We have outlined an adaptation of this meta-model to our 
context of the IS monitoring from threats. The concepts 
are redefined as follows: 
• Intention: the objective for which the user carries out 
his action, 
• Movement: the means used to carry out the objective of 
the user, 
• Target: the resource in the IS to which the action is 
directed to, 
• Gain: the effect produced by the action on the system, 
i.e. if the user makes a success of his attempt to carry out 
an action or not. 
Security information is an Intention directed towards a 
Target which uses a Movement to reach the target, and 
produces a Gain. Figure 2 illustrates the ontology 
concepts, the semantic relation between the concepts, and 
the general semantics of a security event. 
 
In order to identify the intentions of a user’s IS, we have 
studied the attacker strategy [17,26]. In fact, once the 
attacker is in the IS, he can undergo both attacker’s and 
legitimate user’s action.  Analyzing attacker strategy 
provides an opportunity to reconstruct the various steps of 
an attack scenario or an IS utilization scenario, and 
perform pro-active actions to stop IS misuse. According to 
the attacker strategy, we have identified four intentions: 
• Recon: intention of collecting information on a target, 
• Authentication: intention to access to the IS via an 
authentication system, 
• Authorization: intention to access to a resource of an 
IS, 
• System: intention of modifying the availability of an IS 
resources. 
Intentions are carried out through movements. We have 
categorized the movement into seven natures of 
movements: 
• Activity: all the movements related to activities which 
do not change the configuration of the IS, 
• Config: all the movements which change configuration,  
• Attack: all the movements related to attacks, 
• Malware: all the movements related to malwares.  
Malware are malicious software programs designed 
specifically to damage or disrupt a system, 
• Suspicious: all the movements related to the suspicious 
activities detected by the products. In some cases, a 
product generates an event to inform that there was a 
suspicious activity on a resource, this information is 
reported by our modeling as it is. 
• Vulnerability: all the movements related to 
vulnerabilities. 
• Information: the probes can produce messages which 
do not reflect the presence of the action, they reflect a 
state observed on the IS. 
Under each one of these main modes, we have identified 
the natures of movements. A movement is defined by a 
mode of movements (such as Activity, Config, 
Information, Attack, Suspicious, Vulnerability or 
Malware) and a nature of movement (such as Login, Read, 
Execute, etc.), the mode and the nature of the action 
defines the movement. As the model must be adapted to 
the context of the global vision of IS’s security 
monitoring, it is clear that we have defined movements of 
presumed normal actions or a movement of presumed 
dangerous actions. An intention is able to have several 
movements, for example, an access to the IS performed by 
the opening of a user’s session or by an account’s 
configuration or by a bruteforce attack.  
 
Each IS resource can be a target of an IS user activity. 
Targets are defined according to intentions. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Security message semantics 
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• In the case of the Recon intention, an activity of 
information collection is carried out on a host. The target 
represents the host on whom the activity was detected. 
• In the case of the Authentication intention, an activity of 
access to an IS is always carried out under the control of 
an authentication service. The target is represented by a 
pair (target1, target2), target1 and target2 refer 
respectively to the system that performs the 
authentication process and the object or an attribute of 
the object that authenticates on the authentication 
service. 
• In the case of the Authorization intention, an access to 
an IS resource is always carried out under the control of 
a service, this service allows the access to a resource 
based on access criteria. The target is represented by a 
pair (target1, target2). Target1 and Target2 refer 
respectively to the resource which filters the accesses 
(which manages the rights of the users or groups) and 
the resource on which rights were used to reach it. 
• In the case of the System intention, an activity depends 
on the availability of the system. The target is 
represented by a pair (target1, target2). Target1 and 
Target2 refer respectively to a resource and a property of 
the resource, for example (Host, CPU). 
 
These constraints on the targets enable us to fix the 
level of details to be respected in the modeling. We 
have defined the Gain in the IS according to the 
Movement mode. 
• In the case of the Activity and Config movement mode, 
Gain takes the values: Success, Failed, Denied or Error. 
• In the case of the Malware, Vulnerability, Suspicious 
and Attack movement mode, Gain takes the value 
Detected. 
• In the case of the Information movement mode, the 
event focuses on information about the system state. 
Gain is related to information on control and takes the 
values: Valid, Invalid or Notify, or related to information 
on thresholds and takes the values Expired, Exceeded, 
Low or Normal. 
The result is an ontology described by four concepts: 
Intention, Movement, Target, Gain, tree semantics 
relations: Produce, Directed to, Use between the concepts, 
a vocabulary adapted to the context of the IS monitoring 
against security violation, and rules explaining how to 
avoid the ambiguity. For example, for an administrator 
action who succeeded in opening a session on a firewall, 
the ontology describes this action by the 4-uplets: 
Authentication (refers to the intention of the user), 
Activity Login (refers to the movement carried out by the 
user), Firewall Admin (refers to the target of the action 
carried out) and Success (refers to the result of the action).  
The category of the message to which this action belongs 
is:  
Authentication_Activity.Login_Firewall.Admin_Successes. 
We have identified 4 Intentions, 7 modes of Movement, 
52 natures of Movement, 70 Targets and 13 Gains. 
3.3 Event Data Model 
It seems reasonable that the data model for information 
security can be based on standards. We have mentioned in 
2.1 that the format IDMEF becomes a standard. We use 
this data model like a data model for event generated in a 
products interoperability context. 
 
This format is composed of two subclasses Alert and 
Heartbeat. When the analyzer of an IDS detects an event 
for which he has been configured, it sends a message to 
inform their manager. Alert class is composed of nine 
classes: Analyzer, CreateTime, DetectTime, analyserTime, 
Source, Target, Classification, Assessment, and 
AdditionalData. 
 
The IDMEF format Classification class is considered as a 
way to describe the alert semantics. The ontology 
developed in this framework describes all the categories of 
activities that can be undertaken in an IS. We define the 
Classification of the IDMEF data model class by a 
category of the ontology that reflects the semantics of the 
triggered raw event.  Figure 3 illustrates the format 
IDMEF with modification of the class Classification. 
Finally, with the proposed ontology and the adapted 
IDMEF data 
model to information security in the context of global IS 
view, information is homogeneous. Indeed, all processes 
that can be implemented in the analysis server can be 
undertaken including the behavioral analysis. 
4. Behavioral Analysis 
Anomaly Detection System differs from signature based 
Intrusion Detection System by modeling normal reference 
instead of detecting well known patterns. Two periods are 
distinguished in Anomaly Detection: a first period, called 
training period, which builds and calibrates the normal 
reference. The detection of deviant events is performed 
during a second period called exploitation. We propose an 
Anomaly Detection System composed of four main blocks 
as shown in figure 4. The Event Collection and Modeling 
block aims at collecting normalized information from the 
different agents. The Event Selection block would filter 
only relevant information (see section 4.3).  The Anomaly 
Detection block would model user’s behaviors through an 
activity graph and a Bayesian Network (see section 4.1.1) 
during a training period and would detect anomaly (see 
section 4.2) in the exploitation period. Then all behavioral 
anomalies are evaluated by the Anomaly Evaluation block  
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which identifies normal reference update from dangerous 
behavioral anomalies (see section 4.4). Each block will be 
explained in the following sections. 
4.1 Model Method Selection 
Modeling user behavior is a well-known topic in NIDS or 
HIDS regarding local component monitoring. The 
proliferation of security and management equipment units 
over the IS brings a class of anomaly detection. Following 
user behaviors over the IS implies new goals that anomaly 
detection needs to cover.  
 
First of all we need to identify the owner of each event 
occurring on the IS. Then our model should be able to 
hold attributes identifying this owner.  The fact that all 
users travel inside the IS implies that the user activity 
model should models sequences of events representing 
each user’s actions on all IS components. Moreover, user 
behavior can be assimilated to a dynamic system.  
Modeling user activities should enhance periodical 
phenomena and isolate sporadic ones. Then, user 
behaviors hold major information of the usage of the 
system and can highlight the users’ behaviors compliance 
with the security policy. This property should offer the 
ability to make the model fit the IS policies or plan future 
system evolutions to a security analyst. To achieve that, 
user activities modeling should be Human readable.  
 
Several modeling methods are used for normal reference 
modeling in Anomaly Detection (e.g. classification, 
Neural Network, States Automaton, etc). Nevertheless 
three of them deal with the new goals: Hidden Markov 
Model, stochastic Petri Network and Bayesian Network. 
In Hidden Markov Model and stochastic Petri Network 
methods each node of sequences identifies one unique 
system or event state. Modeling the events of each user on 
each IS components would lead to the construction of a 
huge events graph. All these techniques can model 
probabilistic sequences of events but only Bayesian 
Network provides a human understandable model.  
 
Bayesian Networks (BN) are well adapted for user’s 
activities modeling regarding the Global Monitoring goals 
and provide a suitable model support. BN is a probabilistic 
graphical model that represents a set of variables and their 
conditional probabilities. BNs are built around an oriented 
acyclic graph which represents the structure of the 
network. This graph describes casual relationships 
between the variables. By instantiating a variable, each 
conditional probability is computed using mechanism of 
inference and the BN gives us the probabilities of all 
variables regarding this setting.  By associating each node 
to a variable and each state of a node to a specific value, 
BN graph contracts knowledge in human readable graph. 
Furthermore, BNs are useful for learning probabilities in 
pre-computed data set and are well appropriate for the 
deviance detection. BN inference allows injecting variable 
values in BN graph and determining all conditional 
probabilities related to the injected proof. 
 
To achieve a user activity Bayesian Network model, we 
need to create a Bayesian Network structure. This 
structure would refer to a graph of events where each node 
represents an event and each arc a causal relationship 
between two events. Some approaches used learning 
methods (k2 algorithm [11]) to reveal a Bayesian structure 
in a dataset. In the context of a global events monitoring, 
lots of parameters are involved and without some priori 
knowledge, self learning methods would extract 
inconsistent relationships between events.  
 
Following our previous work [34] on user behaviors 
analysis, we specify three event’s attributes involved in 
the identification of casual relationships: user login, IP 
address Source and Destination. Here, we enhance the fact 
that legitimate users performed two types of actions: local 
actions and remote actions. First, we focus our attention 
on event’s attributes identifying local user action.  The 
couple of attributes ‘Source IP address’ and ‘user name’ is 
usually used to identify users. These two attributes allow 
tracking user activities in a same location (e.g. work 
station, application server). To monitor remote user 
 
Fig. 3 The IDMEF data model with the class Classification 
represented   by the category of the ontology that describes the 
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actions only, ‘Destination IP address’ and ‘source IP 
address’ attributes can be used. Then, to monitor a 
physical user location move, only the ‘user login name’ 
can be used to follow them. 
These three attributes, i.e. user login, IP address Source 
and destination, are combined to determine correlation 
rules between two collected events as defined in our work 
[33]. Two events are connected together if: 
• the events share the same source IP address and/or User 
name, 
• the target IP address of the first event is equal to the 
source IP address of the second, 
 
The event correlation process would be realized during a 
training period. The resulting correlated events build an 
oriented graph, called users activity graph, where each 
node represents an event and each arc a causal relationship 
according to the correlation definition. Nevertheless, 
user’s activity graph is too large and concentrated to be 
efficient for a Bayesian structure. We propose a merging 
function that gathers events according to their 
normalization. Based on the edge contraction definition 
[10], we compute a new graph, called merged graph, 
where each node represents a cluster of events sharing the 
same meaning (same semantics) and holding a list of 
events attributes which identifies the owner of each event 
in this cluster. The resulting graph would show casual 
relationships between each user’s events classes as 
described in section 5.1. This merged graph is used as the 
basis of our Bayesian structure. 
 
Classical Bayesian Networks are built on acyclic oriented 
graph which is not the case here because of user activities 
periodical sequences of events.  Although some methods 
exist to  
allow Bayesian Network working on cyclic graph [23], 
most Bayesian libraries do not support cycles. To be 
compliant with this technical constraint, we follow the 
recommendation defined in our work [33] by creating a 
"loop node" expressing recurrent events points in a 
sequence.  
 
After the Bayesian Network structure creation, the training 
data set is used to compute conditional probabilities inside 
the Bayesian Network. We use the simple and fast 
counting-learning algorithm [37] to compute conditional 
probabilities considering each event as an experience.  
 
The time duration between collected events can also be 
modeled by adding information in the Bayesian Network. 
The relation between clusters of events can be 
characterized by a temporal node holding the time 
duration probabilities between events. This extension is 
defined in detail in [35].  
4.2 Anomaly Detection 
The anomaly detection is performed during the 
exploitation period. This period intends to highlight 
abnormal behaviors between received data set and the 
trained user’s activities model. 
 
First of all, we compute a small user activities graph as 
defined in section 4.1.1 for a certain period of time 
represented by a temporal sliding windows on incoming 
events. This graph reflects all the users activities 
interactions for the sliding windows time period. 
This detection graph is then compared with our normal 
user model (BN) which makes two types of deviances 
emerged: graph structure deviance detection and 
probabilistic deviance detection. To check the structure 
compliance between both graphs, we first control the 
Fig. 4 Global Anomaly Intrusion Detection Architecture 
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correctness of each graph’s features, and then we check if 
the detected event’s classes belong to our reference, if the 
relationships between event’s classes are valid and if the 
detected event’s attributes are valid.  Finally, each step of 
each sequence of events inside the detection graph is 
injected in the Bayesian Network. For each step, our 
model evaluates the probability to receive a specific event 
knowing it precedence events, if this probability is below a 
threshold the events is considered as deviant.  When a 
deviance is detected, an alert is sent to the security analyst. 
4.3 Event Selection 
To prevent from a graph overloading, i.e. an expensive 
memory and CPU consumption, we simplify our model to 
provide only the relevant information about User 
Behaviors [34]. 
 
Indeed, with a huge volume of distinct events coming 
from the monitoring IS, the complexity of user activities 
increases greatly. On large IS, lots of interactions can 
appear between user actions.  In the worst case, the 
resulting graph can be a heavy graph.  So, to specify the 
relevance of collected events, we studied the interactions 
between legitimate user’s behaviors and attacker’s strategy 
[34]. 
 
We define a new way to reduce the model’s complexity of 
user or system activities representation. We introduce the 
notion of necessary transit actions for an attacker to 
achieve these objectives: these actions are called 
Checkpoints. Checkpoints are based on different classes of 
attacker scenarios;  
User to Root, Remote to Local, Denial of Service, 
Monitoring/Probe and System Access/Alter Data. We 
enrich this attacks classification with classes of malicious 
actions (Denial of Service, Virus, Trojan, Overflow, etc). 
For each scenario, we provide a list of Checkpoints which 
determine all the necessary legitimate activities needed by 
an attacker to reach such effects. 
For instance, to achieve a User to Root effect an attacker 
chooses between six different variants of scenarios (Gain, 
Injection, Overflow, Bypass, Trojan, Virus). A checkpoint 
related to an Injection 1  is, for example, a command 
launch. We analyzed all the checkpoints of all the possible 
actions leading to one of these five effects. 
We propose a selection of thirteen checkpoints 
representing different types of events involved in at least 
one of the five effects. These checkpoints reflect the basis 
of the information to detect attacker’s activities.  We also 
provide a description of the context to determine if all 
                                                          
1 An injection consists in launching an operation through a started session 
or service. 
checkpoints need to be monitored regarding to the nature 
and the location of a component. 
 
We extract the core information needed to detect misuses 
or attack scenarios. Thus, we do not focus our work on all 
the data involved in misuse or variant of attack scenarios 
but only on one piece of data reflecting the actions shared 
by the user’s and attacker’s behavior. We also study a 
couple of sequences of actions selection following an 
identical consideration.  
 
Both checkpoints and sequences selections provide a 
significant model complexity reduction. Indeed, we 
manage a reduction of 24% of nodes and 60% of links. 
This selection slightly reduces the detection rate of 
unusual system use and reduces false positive of 10%. 
4.4 Anomaly Evaluation 
The lack of classical anomaly detection system is mainly 
due to a high false positive rate and poor information 
description about deviant events. The majority of these 
false positive comes from the evolution of the normal 
system behavior. Without a dynamic learning process, 
anomaly models become outdated and produce false alerts. 
The update mechanism has been enhanced by some  
 
previous works [14,29] which point out two main 
difficulties. 
The first difficulty is the choice of the interval time 
between two update procedures [14]. On one hand, if the 
interval time is too large, some Information System 
evolutions may not be caught by the behavior detection 
engine. On the other hand, if it is too small, the system 
learns rapidly but loses gradual behavior changes. We do 
not focus our work especially on this issue but we assume 
that, by modeling users’ activities behaviors, a day model 
updating is a good compromise between a global User 
behavior evolution and the time consumption led by such 
updates. 
The second difficulty is the selection of appropriate events 
to update the reference in terms of event natures. 
Differentiating normal behavior evolution from suspicious 
deviation is impossible without additional information and 
context definition. To take efficient decisions, we need to 
characterize each event through specific criteria. These 
criteria should identify the objective of the end user 
behind the deviating events. We focus our work on this 
second issue and follow the approach in [40] that analyzes 
end users security behavior. 
 
Our evaluation process evaluates a deviating event 
through a three dimensions evaluation of each deviating 
events: the intention behind the event, the technical 
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expertise needed to achieve the event and the criticality of 
the targeted components by the event, each dimension 
characterizes a property of the deviating event. 
 
All received events are associated with one of the three 
types of movements introduced in section 5.1: the 
intention of the configuration which defines beneficial 
moves trying to improve the system, intention of activity 
which represents usual activity on the IS or neutral activity 
and then the intention of attack which refers to all the 
malicious activities in the system. The degree of deviation 
of an event would inform us how far an event from the 
normal use of the system is. We assume that the more an 
event is far from normal behavior, the more this deviating 
event holds malicious intention. Finally, other past events 
linked by casual relationship with the deviating one lead 
also the malicious intention. The expertise dimension 
defines the technical expertise needed by a user to realize 
an event. This expertise is computed on the type of actions 
realized by the event (action of configuration or action of 
activity), the type of a targeted component (a Router needs 
more technical expertise than a Work Station) and the 
owner of the event (classical user or administrator). 
 
Finally, the event’s impact on IS will depend on the 
targeted component. Thus, we evaluate a deviating event 
also by the criticality of the targeted component. This 
criticality is evaluated by combining vulnerabilities held 
by the targeted component, the location of the targeted 
component (e.g. LAN, Public DeMilitary Zone, etc) and 
its business importance (e.g. critical authentication servers 
are more important than workstations regarding the 
business of the company). 
 
According to all dimensions definitions, each deviating 
point will be located in this three dimension graph. The 
three dimension representation increases the analyst 
visibility of deviating events.  Nevertheless, some 
automatic actions could considerably help analyst to 
decide if a deviant event is related to a normal system 
evolution or to intrusive activity. We propose to build a 
semi-automatic decision module to define which deviating 
events fit normal system evolutions and which ones reflect 
attackers’ activities. Our semi-automatic decision module 
is a supervised machine learning method. We used a 
training data set composed of deviating events located in 
our three-dimension graph. Each point of the training data 
set is identified as a normal system evolution or attackers’ 
activities by security analysts. To learn this expertise 
knowledge, we use a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to 
define frontiers between identified normal points and 
attack points. The SVM technique is a well known 
classification algorithm [20] which tries to find a separator 
between communities in upper dimensions. SVM also 
maximizes the generalization process (ability to not fall in 
an over-training). After the construction of frontiers, each 
deviating events belonging to one community will be 
qualified as a normal evolution or attackers’ activity and 
will receive a degree of belonging to each community. 
After that, two thresholds will be computed. They define 
three areas; normal evolution of system area, suspicious 
events area and attack or intrusive activities area. Each 
deviating events belonging to normal evolution area will 
update our normal Bayesian model. Each deviating events 
belonging to the intrusive activities area or suspicious area 
will create an alarm and send it to an analyst. 
5. Experimentation 
In this section, we aim to make into practice the two 
proposed modules, event modeling and User Behavioral 
Analysis, while using a large corpus of real data. Event 
modeling experience will normalize raw events in the 
ontology’s categories that describe her semantics. User 
behavioral analysis experimentation will use normalized 
events  generated by events modeling module to detect 
abnormal behaviors. 
5.1 Event Modeling 
To study the effectiveness of the modeling proposed in 
Section 5.1, we focused our analysis on the exhaustiveness 
of the ontology (each event is covered by a category) and 
on the reduction of event number to be presented to the 
security analyst.  We performed an experiment on a corpus 
of 20182 messages collected from 123 different products. 
The main characteristic of this corpus is that the events are 
collected from heterogeneous products, where the 
products manipulate different concepts (such as attacks 
detection, virus detection, flaws filtering, etc.). The 
sources used are security equipment logs, audit system 
logs, audit application logs and network component logs. 
Figure 5 illustrates the various probes types used and, into 
brackets, the number of probes per type is specified. The 
classification process was performed manually by the 
experts. The expert reads the message and assigns it to the 
category which describes its semantics.  The expert must 
extract the intention from the action which generated the 
message, the movement used to achieve the intention, the
 
Fig 5: Type of used product 
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target toward which the intention was directed and the 
gain related to this intention. 
We have obtained, with the manual classification of raw 
events, categories of various sizes.  The distribution of the 
messages on the categories is represented on figure 6.  
Some categories are large, the largest one contains 6627 
events which presents a rate of 32,83% of the corpus. This 
is due to the monitoring of the same activity by many 
products or to the presence of these signatures in many 
products. The representation of the events under the same 
semantics reinforces the process of managing the security 
in a cooperative context and facilitates the task of the 
analyst (more detail in [2]). In addition, we had a singleton 
categories, 732 raw events forming their own category, 
which represent a rate of 42,21% of all categories and 
which represent only 3,63% of the corpus. Event modeling 
has reduced the number of events by 91,40% (from 20182 
to 1734). The presence of singleton categories can be 
explained by the following points: only one product 
among the deployed products produces this type of event. 
A signature, which is recognized by a product and not 
recognized by an another, errors made by experts 
generated the creation of new categories, they do not have 
to exist theoretically, and the presence of targets  
monitored rarely  increases  the number of singleton 
categories, because the movement exists several times, but 
only once for these rare targets.  
We observe that the category of the movement Suspicious 
introduced into our ontology is quite necessary to preserve 
the semantics of a raw event which reflects a suspicion. 
These types of events will be processed with the User  
Behavioral Analysis. Ontology does not make it possible 
to analyze event, its goal is to preserve raw events 
semantics. The proportions of the various categories 
depend on the deployed products and the activities to be 
supervised by these products. The conclusion that we can 
draw from this study is that a good line of defense must 
supervise all the activities aimed in an IS, and that the 
cooperative detection should not be focused on the 
number of the deployed products but on the activities to be 
supervised in the IS. This result can bring into question the 
choice of the defense line for the IS. 
5.2 Behavioral Analysis 
Actual Intrusion Detection System operating on a Global 
Information System Monitoring lacks of large test dataset 
aiming at checking their efficiency and their scalability. In 
this section, we provide our results on our Anomaly 
Intrusion Detection System using a real normalized data 
set. We deployed our architecture on a real network and 
collected events coming from hundreds of IS components. 
 
DataSet Analysis: Our dataset analysis comes from a 
large company composed of hundreds of users using 
multiple services. The dataset has been divided into two 
datasets: one training data set composed of events 
collected for 23 days and the other one (test data set) 
composed of events collected for 2 days after the training 
period. The training dataset aims at train-ing our engine 
and creating a user normal behavioral model. The test 
‘dataset’ has been enriched of attack scenarios in or-der to 
test our detection engine. First of all, the test data set is 
used to test the false alarms rate (false positive rate) of our 
engine. Then attack scenarios will be used to determine 
our detection rate, and more over the false negative rate 
(not detected attacks rate) of our engine.  
The major parts of the collected events are web server 
information and authentication information. We can notice 
that during the monitored period, some types of events are 
periodic (like Authentication_Activity .Login. 
Fig. 6 Events Distribution on the Ontology's Categories 
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SysAuth.Account.Success) and other ones are sporadic.  
Moreover, our dataset is composed of more than 70 types 
of events ranging from Authentication actions to System 
usage (like service start). 
Our training dataset, representing the activity of the 
system for 23 days, is composed of 7 500 000 events. The 
test data is composed of 85 000 normal events (two days 
of the System’s activity) and 410 events representing three 
different attack scenarios. These scenarios reflected three 
types of attack effects on the system as introduced in the 
DARPA attacks classification (Remote to local, User to 
Root,...).  Some scenario variants are developed for each 
class. For example, concerning the Remote to Local attack 
scenario, we provide two kinds of variant of scenario as 
follow:  
The remote to local variant one is composed of four 
different classes of events: 
-Authentication_Activity.Login.SysAuth.Account.Success,  
-uthentication_Config.Add.SysAuth.Account.Success,  
-Authentication_Activity.Login.SSH.Admin.Success, 
-System_Activity.Stop.Audit.N.Success. 
The second one holds the classes below: 
-Authentication_Activity.Login.SysAuth.Account.Success, 
-Authentication_Config.Modify.SysAuth.Account.Success, 
-Authentication_Activity.Login.SysAuth.Admin.Success, 
-System_Activity.Execute.Command.Admin.Success. 
 
Each variant of each scenario is reproduced ten times with 
different attributes (login user, IP address Source and 
Destination) belonging to the data set. We can notice that 
all events involved in attack scenarios refer to legitimate 
actions. All these events define a set of event among 
shared actions between legitimate user behaviors and 
attacker strategy.  
Results: The test data set is used to build our user 
activities model. To compute efficiently this model, we 
split the training data set into 440 steps. 
Each Bayesian structure feature (nodes, links, states) 
evolves differently and reaches its stationary point at 
different times.  Nodes (referring to event’s classes) 
become stationary around the step 330 whereas links 
(relationships between event’s classes) continue to evolve 
until step 360.  Only the status (user or process identifier) 
seems to never reach a stationary point. To understand this 
phenomenon, we analyze in depth the evolution of the 
status of each different nodes. We notice that the status of 
one particular node, Authentication_Activity 
.Login.SysAuth.Account.Success, blow up. We 
investigate and discover that the considered company 
owns an e commerce Web server on which each new 
consumer receives a new login account.  That is why when 
other nodes reach their stationary point around the 390th 
step, Authentication_Activity. Login. SysAuth.Account. 
Success node continues to grow. To avoid a complexity 
explosion inside our Bayesian model, we add a constraint 
defining a time of unused events indicator. We define a 
threshold to determine which state of node will be kept 
and which one will be dropped.  
 
The test data set is then processed by our Anomaly 
detection System and our detection’s results are in figure 
7. This table distinguishes each scenario’s events and the 
detection rate for different probability threshold. These 
thresholds could be chosen regarding to the organisms or 
company goals.  In case of a very sensitive IS, the attack 
detection rate needs to be as high as possible. A 
probability threshold of 0.002 achieving a detection rate of 
90% with false positive rate around 14% would be 
suitable. In case of a more transversal use of our approach, 
companies deal with false positives and detection rate. A  
threshold of 0.0001 provides an attack detection rate of 
79% with a false positive rate below 0.5%. Additional 
observation can be made regarding our attack detection 
rate. Most of the time, attack detection rate of detection 
tools reaches 95% but in our context, all our scenarios are 
composed of events which belong to normal behavior. All 
these events do not necessary deviate from the normal 
Fig. 7 Detection Sums 
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behavior that is why our detection rate is slightly below 
classical detection rate. We can estimate that little less 
than 10% of the test attack’s events belong to normal 
behavior (legitimate event and attributes).  Despite this 
constraint, we still reach detection rate from 80% to 90%. 
6. Conclusion and Perspectives 
Our main goal throughout this paper was to describe a 
framework that addresses companies: managing the 
company’s security information to protect the IS from 
threats. We proposed an architecture which provides a 
global view of what occurs in the IS. It is composed of 
different agent types collecting and modeling information 
coming from various security products (such as firewalls, 
IDS and antivirus), Operating Systems, applications, 
databases and other elementary information relevant for 
the security analysis.  An Analysis Server gathers all 
information sent by agents and provides a behavioral 
Analysis of the user activities. 
 
A new modeling for describing security information 
semantics is defined to address the heterogeneity problem. 
The modeling is an ontology that describes all activities 
that can be undertaken in an IS. By using real data 
triggered from products deployed to protect the assets of 
an organization, we shown that the modeling reduced the 
amount of events and allowed automatic treatments of 
security information by the analysis algorithms. The 
model is extensible, we can increase the vocabulary 
according to the need such as adding a new movement to 
be supervised in the IS. The model can be applied to other 
contexts of monitoring such as the monitoring of physical 
intruders in a museum; all we have to do is to define the 
adequate vocabulary of the new context.  
 
We demonstrated that unknown attack scenarios could be 
efficiently detected without hard pre description 
information through our User Behavioral Analysis. By 
using only relevant information, User’s behaviors are 
modeled through a Bayesian network. The Bayesian 
Network modeling allows a great detection effectiveness 
by injecting incoming events inside the model and 
computing all conditional probabilities associated. Our 
Anomaly evaluation module allows updating dynamically 
a User’s model, reducing false positive and enriching 
Behavioral Anomalies. The experimentation on real data 
set highlights our high detection rate on legitimate action 
involved in Attack scenarios. As data are modeled in the 
same way, User Behavioral Analysis results show that the 
effectiveness of the analysis processes is highly dependent 
on the data modeling. 
   
The proposed framework can be useful to other processes. 
Indeed, the ontology is necessary to carry out counter-
measures process, the results of User Behavioral Analysis 
allowing the administrator to detect legitimate users that 
deviate from its behavior, a reaction process can then be 
set up to answer malicious behaviors.  
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